

Message Text

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ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 ACDA-05 IO-10 SAJ-01 OMB-01 EB-07 TRSE-00

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R 220847Z JUL 75

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1824

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 09888

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, JA, KS, XE, US

SUBJ: TOKYO AMBASSADORS CONFERENCE ON POST VIETNAM ASIA

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

SUMMARY: AS PART OF PREPARATION FOR PRIME MINISTER MIKI'S
VISIT TO WASHINGTON, TOKYO CONFERENCE OF KEY AMBASSADORS
DISCUSSED POST-VIETNAM ASIA/JULY 15 AND 16. THEY DIFFERED
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ON TIMING FOR FORMAL REUNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM,
BUT AGREED THAT DEFACTO PROCESS ALREADY ADVANCED. WHILE SOVIET
AND CHINESE WOULD JOSTLE FOR INFLUENCE, IT UNLIKELY THAT
EITHER WOULD ACHIEVE PREDOMINANCE IN INDOCHINA. PRC AND
DRV WOULD TAKE AID FROM ANY SOURCE WITHOUT PERMITTING MUCH
INFLUENCE ON THEIR OWN POLICIES. JAPAN SHOULD CONCENTRATE

ON DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP WITH HANOI KNOWING THAT PRG
TIES WILL BE COMPLICATED BY GVN DEBT ISSUE.
CONFEREES EXPECTED NO LARGE-SCALE ARMS/INFILTRATION
INTO ASEAN COUNTRIES FOR TIME BEING. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
"NATIONAL RESILIENCE" WILL BE COMPLICATED BY AMBIVALENT
ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN CAPITAL. ASEAN COUNTRIES WILL
IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND REDUCE STRONG DEPENDENCE
ON US WHEN THIS EXISTS. NEUTRALIZATION CONCEPT SHOULD
BE UNDERSTOOD AND TAKEN SERIOUSLY, THOUGH DIRECT SUPPORT
HAS DRAWBACKS FOR JAPAN. EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO BROADEN
AND STRENGTHEN ASEAN AS REGIONAL ORGANIZATION.
US COMMITMENT TO KOREA REMAINS RELIABLE. CHINA AND
SOVIET UNION RELUCTANT TO SUPPORT CONFLICT ON PENINSULA,
AND OPPOSITION TO PARK REGIME STILL TOO WEAK TO THREATEN
STABILITY OF PARK REGIME. JAPAN SHOULD CONTINUE TO WELCOME
US TROOP PRESENCE IN ROK, TRY TO MINIMIZE EFFECTS OF REPRESSIVE
PARK MEASURES, AND EDUCATE JAPANESE PUBLIC ON IMPORTANCE OF
ROK TO JAPAN. LINES TO NORTH KOREA SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN.
END SUMMARY.

1. AMBASSADORS STATIONED IN ASEAN AND ANZUS COUNTRIES, LAOS, UNITED
STATES PRC AND SOVIET UNION PLUS FORMER CHIEFS OF MISSION IN SAIGON
AND PHNOM PENH MET IN TOKYO JULY 15 AND 16 TO DISCUSS POSTWAR
SITUATION IN ASIA. PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE WAS TO PROVIDE
FRESH APPRAISAL OF AREA PROBLEMS AS BACKGROUND TO PREPARATIONS
FOR MIKI'S CONVERSATIONS WITH US LEADERS. ACCORDING TO NEW
ASIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU DEP DIR EDAMURA, DISCUSSIONS CENTERED AROUND
INDOCHINA, ASEAN AND KOREAN PENINSULA. REFERRING TO FONOFF
REPORTS OF DISCUSSIONS, EDAMURA BRIEFED EMBOFF ON HIGHLIGHTS
OF CONFERENCE AS FOLLOWS:

INDOCHINA

2. AFTER HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SAIGON'S DEFEAT CONFEREES
CONCLUDED THAT COMMUNIST VICTORY NOT SIMPLY RESULT OF
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IRREVERSIBLE TIDE OF NATIONALISM, THOUGH STRONG NATIONALIST
TENDENCY OBSERVABLE IN ALL COUNTRIES OF AREA NOW AND BEFORE
APRIL 30. AS A RESULT OF THESE FEELINGS AND OF SAIGON'S FATE NO
ASIAN COUNTRIES WILL WANT TO FALL UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
OUTSIDE POWERS.

3. PROGNOSSES FOR UNIFICATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM
DIFFERED WIDELY, RANGING FROM ONE GUESS THAT PROCESS WOULD BE
COMPLETE BY END OF 1976 TO ANOTHER THAT JOB WOULD TAKE TEN
YEARS. CONSENSUS WAS THAT NORTH WOULD NOT PERMIT SOUTH TO
DEVELOP CADRES WITH SOUTHERN IDENTITY. NO ONE UNRESPONSIVE TO
NORTH WILL BE ALLOWED TO GOVERN IN SOUTH. FORMAL PROCESS
OF UNIFICATION MIGHT BE SLOW BUT PROCESS ALREADY WELL LAUNCHED
IN FACT AND SUBSTANCE. TIMING OF FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT
NOT THAT IMPORTANT. POLICY TOWARD PRG SHOULD NOT

BE FORMULATED ON PREMISE THAT THERE WILL BE A SOUTH VIETNAM WITH AN IDENTITY OF ITS OWN. HOWEVER, FACT THAT SOUTH VIETNAM HAS APPLIED FOR UN MEMBERSHIP SEPARATELY IS EVIDENCE THAT HANOI BELIEVES FORMAL PROCESS WILL TAKE LONG TIME.

4. AS FAR AS BIG POWER RIVALRIES IN AREA CONCERNED, CONFEREES SEE SOVIET UNION AS HAVING ADVANTAGE IN HANOI, WITH CHINA TRYING TO BALANCE THIS OFF BY EXERCISING PROMINENT INFLUENCE IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS. CONFERENCE CONSENSUS WAS THAT SOVIETS NOT BE PARTICULARLY FEARED IN AREA. IN FACT CONFEREES RATED CHANCES GOOD THAT INDOCHINA WOULD NOT FALL UNDER THE PREDOMINANT INFLUENCE OF ANY ONE POWER.

5. AMBASSADORS BELIEVE THAT BOTH DRV AND PRG ARE PRAGMATICALLY ORIENTED. THEY WILL TAKE ASSISTANCE FROM ANYWHERE, BUT JAPAN SHOULD NOT HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS THAT GRANTING AID WILL PROVIDE ANY LEVERAGE OR INFLUENCE OVER POLICIES OF NEW COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS. CONFEREES BELIEVE JAPAN SHOULD ADOPT "CORRECT ATTITUDE" AND HOLD PRG RESPONSIBLE FOR THIEU

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 9888

GOVERNMENT DEBTS AS PREREQUISITE TO FUTURE GOJ COOPERATION. THEY ELIEVE THERE IS VERY LITTLE CHANCE THAT PRG WILL ACCEPT THIEU OBLIGATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, FUTURE OF GOJ-PRG RELATIONS LIEKLY TO BE DIFFICULT. IMMEDIATE PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO FINISH NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI ON ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS. FURTHER DELAY WILL RISK PRG DEBTS QUESTION GETTING ENTANGLED IN THOSE KEY NEGOTIATIONS.

6. ASEAN

CONSENSUS OF CONFERENCE WAS THAT NO LARGE SCALE CONFIDENTIAL

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ARMS FLOWS FROM SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS TO INSURGENTS IN NEIGHBORING ASEAN COUNTRIES HAD OCCURRED OR WERE LIKELY IN NEAR FUTURE. WHEN INTERNAL SITUATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM IS CONSOLIDATED, GOJ SHOULD REVIEW ENTIRE QUESTION AGAIN.

7. CONFEREES AGREED WITH PRESIDENT SUHARTO THAT ASEAN COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN "NATIONAL RESILIENCE". THEY NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN CAPITAL. THE MORE "RESILIENT" THE GOVERNMENTS BECAME, THE STRONGER WOULD BE THEIR DESIRES TO MAINTAIN TIGHT CONTROL OVER CAPITAL FLOWS FROM OUTSIDE AT SAME TIME, GOVERNMENTS REALIZE THAT DEVELOPMENT NOT POSSIBLE AT ACCEPTABLE RATE WITHOUT FOREIGN HELP. IN DISCUSSING HOW TO COPE WITH ATTITUDE, CONFEREES REVIEWED IN STANDARD FASHION PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY JAPANESE COMPANIES WHICH HAVE INVESTED IN ASEAN COUNTRIES.

8. IN GENERAL, CONFEREES ASSESSED THAT ASEAN COUNTRIES INTEND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US WHILE STILL KEEPING LINES TO US OPEN. GOVERNMENTS WILL WANT TO REDUCE STRONG DEPENDENCE ON US IF SUCH IS CASE. VIRTUALLY ALL AMBASSADORS STATIONED IN ASEAN AGREED THAT THOUGH NEUTRALIZATION IDEA VERY VAGUE, CONCEPT HAS DEVELOPED CONSENSUS BEHIND IT, NOT ONLY AMONG GOVERNMENTS BUT ALSO WITHIN COUNTRIES OF AREA. THOUGH NO ONE KNOWS HOW NEUTRALIZATION WOULD WORK, NO ONE CHALLENGES THE IDEA, AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE MAKING MISTAKE IF THEY DISREGARDED IT. WHILE MOST OF CONFEREES FAVORED AT LEAST EXPRESSING UNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPT, AMBASSADORS STATIONED OUTSIDE AREA QUESTIONED ADVISABILITY OF SUPPORTING NEUTRALIZATION, SOME FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS. "WORDS START WALKING BY THEMSELVES," SAID ONE AMBASSADOR WHO FEARED THAT GOJ BACKING FOR NEUTRALIZATION IN SEA

WOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT BY OPPOSITION PARTIES IN JAPAN.

9. CONFEREES AGREED THAT POSSIBILITIES FOR ASEAN AS A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE EXPLORED MORE FULLY BY JAPAN. THEY NOTED THAT AUSTRALIA HAD OFFERED \$5 MILLION TO FINANCE PROJECT ON WHICH ASEAN STATES COULD ALL AGREE AND CONFIDENTIAL

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SUGGESTED THAT GOJ CONSIDER SUCH ASSISTANCE. THEY GUESSED THAT GOVERNMENTS OF INDOCHINA WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN NOVEMBER MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AT SINGAPORE. ABSENCE OF NEW SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT REDUCE MUCH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MEETING SINCE INDOCHINESE STATES HAD NOT PLAYED ROLE BEFORE. NEW MEMBERSHIP FOR AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND BURMA WAS BELIEVED IMPORTANT. THOUGH NO CONSENSUS EMERGED ON FUTURE ORIENTATION MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE MIGHT TAKE, SOME AMBASSADORS SUGGESTED THAT SCOPE OF CONSULTATIONS BE EXPANDED BEYOND DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO INCLUDE TRADE, PRIMARY PRODUCTS, AND POLITICAL SUBJECTS.

10. KOREAN PENINSULA

CONFEREES AGREED THAT US LEERY OF GETTING INVOLVED IN ASIAN ARMED CONFLICTS BUT THAT COMMITMENT TO ROK REMAINED RELIABLE, IN PART BECAUSE US RECOGNIZED IMPORTANCE OF KOREA TO SECURITY OF JAPAN. THEY SAW NO REASON TO BELIEVE USSR AND CHINA WISHED TO BECOME EMBROILED IN MILITARY ADVENTURES ON PENINSULA. DOMESTICALLY, OPPOSITION PARTIES UNITED WITH PARK ON DEFENSE ISSUE. POLITICAL STRENGTH OF STUDENTS SHOULD NOT BE OVERESTIMATED. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANTI-PARK SENTIMENT IN ARMY. FOR TIME BEING THERE NO DANGER OPPOSITION FORCES UNITING TO THREATEN STABILITY OF PARK GOVERNMENT.

11. JAPAN'S POLICY, CONFEREES AGREED, SHOULD BE TO WELCOME PRESENCE OF US ARMED FORCES IN ROK. GOJ SHOULD BE WILLING TO EXERT CAUTIOUS INFLUENCE TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF OPPRESSIVE MEASURES ADOPTED BY PARK REGIME, EVEN THOUGH JAPAN VULNERABLE TO ROK CHARGES OF BEING "HO CHI MINH TRAIL" FOR COMMUNIST INFILTRATION TO ROK. GOJ SHOULD ALSO TAKE ACTION DOMESTICALLY TO INCREASE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF ROK'S IMPORTANCE TO JAPAN.

12. AS FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA, AMBASSADORS FELT THAT WINDOW FOR CONTACT SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN OVER LONG RUN, THOUGH DRAMATIC MOVES LIKE CROSS RECOGNITION SEEMED IMPRACTICAL (THOUGH DESIRABLE) FOR NOW. GRADUAL STEPS TO DEVELOP RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH KOREA SHOULD BE FIRM TENET OF JAPANESE POLICY NOT SUBJECT TO PRESSURE EITHER FROM OPPOSITION PARTIES OR BUSINESS INTERESTS. CONFIDENTIAL

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